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Founded in 1971, Raporal was a venture of 18 pig farmers whose aim was to produce 
good quality animal food. The success of this venture allowed Raporal to expand down 
the entire chain of pork and beef production. The focus on a vertical production 
structure has also contributed to Raporal’s ability to respond effectively to the industry 
challenges and become one of the top players in the sector in Portugal.  
Despite its success, the changes in the macro-economic environment that accounted for 
the leading position of supermarkets in the grocery market and the growth of their 
private labels, presented a threat to Raporal, which experienced a significant decrease in 
sales, in 2006.  In face of these events, its management looked for ways to establish 
binding agreements with important distributors in order to guarantee their space in the 
market. This partnership resulted in a sudden strategic change for Raporal which 
initiated its path in the production of a differentiated product.  
This case illustrates the importance of the producer and distributor relations, and 
includes themes such as differentiation, vertical integration and the strong growth of 
private labels, topics which are addressed in the literature review with the aid of some 
relevant models.  
The analysis in the teaching note section focuses mainly on the development of 
potential solutions to Raporal’s current problems. Amongst which is the strong 
bargaining power of buyers and the effectiveness of differentiation as a means to 














A Raporal aparece em 1971, resultado da associação de 18 suinicultores com o intuito 
de produzir ração de alta qualidade para os seus animais. Através de uma gestão 
dinâmica e ambiciosa a Raporal posiciona-se agora em toda a fileira de carne de suíno e 
bovino, e com uma estrutura de produção verticalizada, tem respondido de forma eficaz 
aos desafios da indústria para se tornar numa das maiores empreses no sector em 
Portugal.  
Apesar do sucesso actual, em 2006, as mudanças no plano macroeconómico, com a 
liderança dos supermercados no sector de retalho alimentar e o crescimento das marcas 
próprias ameaçavam o sucesso da Raporal, que sentia uma queda acentuada nos seus 
resultados. Fase às adversidades, a administração da Raporal procurava estabelecer uma 
parceria com um dos líderes da distribuição moderna, com o intuito de garantir o seu 
lugar no mercado. Esta parceria resultou de uma mudança no plano estratégico da 
Raporal que aumentou o seu portfólio de produtos diferenciados.  
Este caso é interessante por abordar o tema do relacionamento entre produtor e 
distribuidor. De uma perspectiva académica a Raporal abrange temas como a 
diferenciação, a verticalização e o forte crescimento das marcas brancas. Temas que são 
abordados com o apoio de modelos relevantes introduzidos na revisão de literatura.  
A análise final foca-se essencialmente na exploração de potenciais soluções para os 
problemas actuais da Raporal, entre eles o forte puder de negociação dos compradores, 
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I. Introduction  
 
This dissertation builds up a case study of Raporal, a company operating in the 
agricultural and food business, focusing on how it has been successfully able to adjust 
its strategy to the changing industry needs, which include the strong movement of the 
consumers towards supermarkets and their private label products.  
Operating in the markets of animal production, compound feed production, meat 
slaughtering and meat processing, the case deals with the emerging legislation affecting 
the sector, but most importantly, how Raporal has been able to dig its ways through 
supermarket shelves in order to guarantee its sales.  
This thesis offers an illustration of today’s manufacturers hot topic; that is, how to deal 
with the increasing bargaining power of modern distributors? It therefore serves as a 
useful tool for management and strategic courses, as it tests the use of some of the most 
academically referred strategic models.  
The question on “how producers in the animal production sector can overcome the 
threat of the increasing bargaining power of modern distributors?” is explored 
throughout the three main parts of the dissertation.   
The first section of the thesis will describe both the company’s history and its strategy 
throughout the last years. This part is also an important introduction to the major 
industry developments in the food production sector.  
Secondly the Literature Review will introduce some strategic models that will then be 
specifically applied to Raporal’s case.  
Lastly the Teaching Note will examine Raporal’s strategic approach with the support of 
a guideline with essential questions for class discussion.  
With time Raporal has experienced major alterations in its strategic direction. As the 
environment continues to change it is most likely that new routes will be pursued, 
although only time will let us know. Nonetheless the case invites the readers to forecast 
and recommend these future strategic moves!  



























In September 2013, the board of directors of Raporal, a large Portuguese firm operating in the 
agricultural and food industry, talked about the day back in 2007 when they set in a meeting 
with representatives of Jerónimo Martins, a very important client. Although it seemed like 
another one of many past meetings, huge changes occurred after this conversation, where a JM
1
 
representative demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the current general quality of pig meat in 
the market when compared with what was available in his grandparent’s time. The challenge 
was on; Raporal had to produce meat that resembled that of the past when pigs were fed on 





Raporal started as an animal compound feed factory, in 1971, and had grown vertically since 
then to become one of the most important players in Portugal, present in the compound feed 
production, animal production, meat slaughtering and meat processing market. (Refer to Exhibit 
1 for the contribution per business unit). Its business had grown gradually over the years and 
especially during the last 6 years, reaching a business volume of 86,37million euros in 2012. 
Given the nature of the business, profit margins were generally low, although during 2012 
Raporal increased its profit margin to approximately 4.6%
2
, a significant improvement from 
2011 when the margins were around 3%. (For details on the annual results refer to Exhibits 2 & 
3).  
The Start of a Big Thing  
 
The origin of Raporal takes us back to the spring of 1971. At that time Sr. Joaquim Sousa, a 
local pig farmer, in Montijo, in the south bank of the Tagus River, near Lisbon, and 17 other 
individual pig farmers struggled to find a reliable and affordable supplier of compound feed for 
their animals.  
Together, these farmers decided to start producing food for their animals. The venture was 
called Raporal, and the plant was built near their pig farms. This same plant has been updated 
and was still in use 40 years later.  
The plant allowed the farmers to feed their animals, while additional production was sold to 
external buyers. As a result of the success of the venture, the farmers decided almost 10 years 
later, in 1980, to acquire the first of many, pig farms under the venture ownership.  
                                                          
1
 Jerónimo Martins, the group that owns Pingo Doce  
2
 These figures refer to earnings  before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
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Later on, driven by the progress of this association, in October 1986, Raporal expanded its 
presence down the production line by acquiring Stec, a slaughterhouse and meat processing 
plant
3
. Stec become the name of the business unit related to the meat processing and become the 
brand name of products sold by Raporal. Later on, due to technological improvements in the 
industry, Raporal invested in the modernization of this unit, which was still being used almost 
20 years later when the company had around 10% of the Portuguese market share for bovine 
slaughters and 5% for pig slaughters. At that time, Raporal was specialized in the production of 
compound feed, animal production, slaughtering and transformation of pigs, bovines and sheep, 
and owned over 40 cattle farms.  (Refer to Exhibit 4 for details on Raporal’s Values)  
The End of an Era  
It was in 2006 when Raporal experienced a year of negative growth. The compound feed plant 
produced around 61thousand tones of animal food, 16% less than in 2005. Moreover, the 
revenues from the slaughterhouse decreased by 13% in comparison to the previous year. Overall 
Raporal generated 33 million euros of revenue in 2006, 3% less than in 2005. It was also at that 
point that the previous management (and current shareholders) invited the present management 
to take over, recognizing that it was time to change! 
The main focus became the optimization of the resources and the technical updating of 
production units. “At that point the animal feed plant was operating at about 50% of its full 
capacity while the slaughterhouse at around 20% of its capacity” said Eng. Cristina de Sousa, 
President of Raporal. (Refer to Exhibits 5 & 6 for the evolution of the productivity of the animal 
feed plant and slaughterhouse)  
Due to the vertical structure of the business one way to boost the capacity utilization was to 
increase the number of cattle farms through either acquisition or renting. In 2007 the number of 
cattle farms had gone up from 3 to 14, consequently more animal feed had to be produced and 
more animals killed. This trend was still true in 2013. (Refer to Exhibit 7 for details on the 
number of pig farms). Furthermore, as the number of reproductive females increased from 699 
in 2006 to 8157 in 2012, efforts were placed on reorganizing the processes at the cattle farms, 
creating a more efficient production system under the brand Rapfarms
4
. (Refer to Exhibit 8 for 
information on the number of reproductive female pigs).  
Additionally, in 2012, legislation pressures meant that Raporal had to incur an 827 thousand 
euros investment in the adaptation of its facilities to the animal welfare standards.  
                                                          
3 The processing plant is where the meat is prepared for consumption 
4 The brand Rapfarms was created to improve the organization and methods used in the livestock creation sector, as well as to highlight the experience   
and consequently the quality of the operations.  
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However, the changes were successful, demonstrated through the increase in the productivity of 
the female pigs over the years. In 2012 productivity per female pig was 27,44piglets, the highest 
over the last years. (Refer to Exhibit 9 to see the productivity of a female pig per year) 
Cristina de Sousa strongly believed that the way was to continue to expand vertically. Since 
2006 revenue volume grew from 33 million euros to 86 million euros in 2012. Both the animal 
feed plant and the slaughterhouse were being used almost to their full capacity.  
The Cattle farms however were not the only sector to experience major changes, since a clear 
priority in the minds of this new generation of leaders was to update the compound feed plant. 
This came at an investment of approximatly1.6 million euros that was completed at the 
beginning of this new mandate. The result was an efficient automatized and certified plant that 
would in the future be able to give enough response to the planned expansion of the cattle 
farms.  
Another urgent concern for the four managers was to change radically the distribution strategy, 
as the current strategy was ineffective and extremely costly. Large retailers were becoming 
more powerful and traditional smaller distributors were disappearing. In order to adapt to this 
trend, Raporal soon started to negotiate with large retailers for the distribution of its products. 
Amongst these retailers was Pingo Doce.  
In 2009 another change occurred as Raporal opened its first store in Montijo, “A Loja da 
Carne”, selling directly to the end consumer. This was another way to ensure the outflow of its 
products while at the same time increasing its reputation. Since then the success of the store had 
been growing, and the sales volume had been increasing steadily, reaching 869 thousand euros 
at the end of 2012, and with it, the popularity of the meat produced by Raporal (Refer to Exhibit 
10 to see the layout of the store). 
Market Trends 
 
In 2012 private consumption in Portugal went down by 5.4% (INE), this decline affected the 
consumption of essential goods. Leading to these results were the increasing unemployment 
figures that reached 15, 7% (INE), an accentuated decrease in household income and a major 
break in access to credit.  
Additionally to the decrease in consumption, consumers were also changing their buying habits. 
In 2012 results indicated that shoppers were more sensitive to price. Family shopping bags were 
generally smaller and increasingly made up of private label products. According to Kantar 
Worldpanel, the retailer’s private brand had reached a market share of 38.4% in the beginning 
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of 2012, 11% more than in the same period of the previous year. According to a study by 
Nielsen, part of this success is due to the fact that private label product were generally 10% to 
30% cheaper. This triggered the expansion of private labels and the reduction of the variety of 
products offered by large distributors.  
Another trend observed in 2012 was the priority given to convenience, and hence the movement 
of modern retailers to urban areas, closer to the consumer, and away from the hypermarket 
format, typically located away from city centres. In addition, traditional retailing continued to 
lose market share. In 2012 this trend was aggravated by a 5, 8% decline in sales of traditional 
retailers in comparison to the same period in 2011, a tendency that is expected to continue. 
(Refer to Exhibit 11 for the Modern Retailers’ Market Share). 
As traditional retailers faded away, modern distributors, such as Pingo Doce and Continente saw 
their market share increase, despite the economic downturn.  
For producers, like Raporal, this meant a continuous decrease in their bargaining power and less 
control over the price of its own product. At that point the phenomenon of dumping
5
 was 
becoming popular amongst the large distributors, who used their bargaining power to push 
producer’s margins below zero. 
This trend also resulted in various attempts by the government to regulate these negotiations. 
While there were some talks about a new law designed to stop supermarkets from exercising 
dumping, the code of conduct already circulating had been trying to enforce some of the 
manufacturers’ rights. Still there was the need for PARCA
6
a voluntary initiative to facilitate the 
relations between producers and distributors, which have positively contributed to increasing 
the transparency between these negotiations.  
While the intensity of the competition within the retailing sector kept increasing, the story for 
the producers was not much different. According to Raporal, the price of meat was, 25% 
cheaper than it was five years earlier, due to increasing competition in the sector, mainly 
through imports. Eng. Pedro Lagoa, one of the board members and responsible for the pig farms 
at Raporal, added that, “almost half of the meat we eat comes from overseas”.  
This highlights the need for global common regulations in this sector in order to increase 
Portugal’s competitiveness. As numbers show that back in 1970, 100% of the pork meat in the 
market was produced “at home”, while 40 years later, only 60% of the pig meat was nationally 
produced. 2012 was also marked by a significant increase in exports. However, the figures 
                                                          
5
 Term often used in international trade to refer to “exporting goods at prices lower than the home-market prices” here referring to retailers selling products at extremely low 
prices, compared to their production costs. 
6 Platform for the support of agri-food relations, translated from Portuguese: Plataforma de Acompanhamento as Relações Agroalimentares 
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stayed at 67 million euros. This is well below the 217 million euros of livestock imports, 
enforcing Portugal’s deficit position (INE2013).  
Changing the Eating Habits 
 
The international tendency in the developed economies for the last 5 years showed a decrease in 
the consumption of meat. Advocates referred to animal rights, personal health, social status and 
economic situation. Following this same trend, Portuguese consumers showed a decrease in the 
consumption of meat, however pork still accounted for the largest percentage of the total meat 
consumption (Refer to exhibit 12 for the Portuguese meat consumption trends).  
For that same period there was a decrease of 5,5% per habitant in the consumption of meat, in 
Portugal, which represented less 6,2kg of meat per person, of which 2,3kg were bovine meat 
and 3,2kg were pork meat.  
The Agricultural and Food Sector  
In 2012 producers were faced with a challenging year, as the average prices of the animals 
increased by only 1%, against the 6.6% increase in the production costs, mostly due the prices 
of the animal feed, the major cost in pork production.  
Historically raw material price fluctuations have always been a source of uncertainty to 
producers. Lately the constant upward trend and future perspective of the prices of these raw 
materials dictated an increase in the cost of animal food. This imposed an additional challenge 
to many producers who increased their working capital needs but at the same time had less 
access to credit. The situation was further aggravated by the unbalanced relationship between 
production and retailers which has not allowed producers to pass on the increased costs on to 
the final consumer. According to INE, Portuguese supermarkets sold pork meat at lower prices 
than anywhere else in Europe.  
Another major trend was the general increase in the regulations, to comply with food safety 
norms as well as obey to animal welfare rules. Amongst many measures, producers were 
required to have a minimum light amount and maximum noise level, as well as give their 
animals’ permanent access to materials for rooting and playing. Moreover producers had to have 
a minimum amount of land available per animal for waste disposal. In addition, for pig 
producers a minimum weaning age of four weeks was established. These changes meant a 
significant increase in production costs both in Portugal and in the rest of the EU. However the 
same was not true for other parts of the world that at the same time competed directly with EU 
producers.  
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This called for the attention of the need of a more competitive environment, with less 
bureaucracy, but more importantly with world common legislative norms.  
 “From Farm to Table” 
Historically Raporal used to distribute its products through three main channels; namely door-
to-door selling, exports and its own store. While the first targeted mostly restaurants, small 
retailers, and individual households, exports were mostly done to Spain and Venezuela.  
Especially in the case of door-to-door selling, Raporal assumed all the costs associated with the 
transportation of the meat. Additionally, it required a large number of full time equivalent (FTE) 
to undertake the related functions, and the payments were never guaranteed. Moreover due to 
the unpredictability of the sales, the operations were less efficient as planning was hard.  
While the potential customer pool through exports was significant the same could not be said 
about the other channels used by Raporal which basically did not manage to reach enough 
customers.  
Most recently, in 2010, given the current market conditions and the management ambition to 
change this distribution method, it started to move more intensively towards the modern 
distributors. Immediately some issues were raised since using large retailers meant giving up the 
control over the positioning and even price of their own product. In addition the products were 
mostly sold under the retailers’ private label, which meant that Raporal’s brand would not be 
associated with the products sold. Nonetheless the upturns were substantial, payments were 
done on time, transportation costs were reduced, and as sales were predetermined, production 
could be planned allowing for significant improvements in production efficiency. Ultimately 
Raporal gained access to a much larger number of consumers which triggered a large sales 
volume. 
While modern retailers became an important focus of Raporal’s distribution strategy, exports 
remained a significant channel. 2012 was marked by the continuation of the internationalization 
process, as sales to foreign markets reached € 3 million, of which €878 thousand resulted from a 
one-shot operation to Venezuela. Eng. Pedro Lagoa stated the importance of expanding its 
markets in order to minimize the dependency on the internal market that has shown clear signs 
of weakness. Moreover he referred the need to establish new partnerships in order to guarantee a 
sustainable growth.  
Additionally to the modern distribution and foreign markets, Raporal had yet another channel to 
distribute its products. It started soon after the acquisition of Stec, when a number of buyers 
would gather in the dispatching area to buy the meat products. Clients were mostly restaurant 
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owner’s butchers and private consumers, but as these increased in number Raporal encountered 
a logistics problem, with people circulating in the dispatching area. In order to continue to 
satisfy these customers, in 2009 Raporal opened its store, strategically located near the 
dispatching area. Later on, driven by the success of the small store it rebuilt the store investing 
in a more customer friendly format.  
In 2013 Raporal had overcome the period of transition, and was working together with the large 
distributors. “Pingo Doce was responsible for more than 50% of the sales” referred Sr. Mário 
Guarda, one of the board members of Raporal and responsible for the meat slaughtering and 
meat processing units. The percentage of sales through small sellers was becoming more and 
more irrelevant. And although most of the sales through, Pingo Doce were made under its 
private label, Raporal kept selling some differentiated products such as the cracklings
7
, canned 
sausages, and ready to consume “bifanas”, amongst others, under the brand Stec. (Refer to 
Exhibit 13 to see some of Raporal’s branded products)  Moreover, Raporal kept exploring its 
foreign opportunities as well as maintaining its store.  
A Powerful Distributor  
Pingo Doce was one of the largest supermarket operators in Portugal, owned by the Jerónimo 
Martins’s group. In 2012 its sales revenue reached 3, 9 thousand million euros. (Refer to Exhibit 
14 for the evolution of sales revenue) Other than Pingo Doce the group also operated the cash 
and carrier Recheio. Its international operations included chains in Poland and Colombia.  
In 2012 it had 372 Pingo Doce stores spread over Portugal. This represented 452,588 m2 of 
selling area. Its stores were strategically located ensuring proximity to the client.   
According to a study by Kantar, Pingo Doce has managed to grow its market share which 
equally translates into a decrease in the market share of almost all competitors with the 
exception of Continente, which did not seem to be very affected.  
Its main competitor, Continente, belonged to the Sonae group; together these represented more 
than 50 % of the total food retailing market. (Exhibit 15 shows the top ten Portuguese retailers 
market share)This concentration resulted in tough competition, “if we choose to supply Pingo 
Doce we automatically will not be able to supply Continente” says Eng. Cristina Sousa when 
talking about negotiations with their distributors.   
Globally JM occupied the 76
th
 position amongst the 250 largest world retailers according to the 
2013 Global Powers of Retailing ranking, by Deloitte.  
                                                          
7
 The Torresmos Soltos (Pork Cracklings) was Awarded "Sabor do Ano 2009" ("Taste of the Year 2009")  
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Pingo Doce started back in early 1980’s when Jerónimo Martins’s group started to operate in 
the supermarket industry. Since then it continued to grow, mostly through acquisitions of 
existing stores, ventures with important retailers, and opening of new stores.  
In 2004 it started to heavily invest in the development and of its private labels, following a 22% 
decrease in the number of products offered in the supermarkets and a general shift towards low 
prices. Additionally the private label concept was further developed. In 2013 conditions allowed 
for the growth of the supermarket private labels while product variety continued to decrease. 
Estimates suggested that in 2016, 50% of the sales will be from private label product, increasing 
the pressure on producers like Raporal to ensure their space in the market.  
The Story 
Raporal had become an important player in the Agricultural and Food business. It was estimated 
that revenues for 2013 would reach €100 million of which around 5% would be profit. In 2012 
Raporal produced over 100,000 hundred thousand tons of animal compound feed and 
slaughtered over 300.000 animals. Pigs still accounted for about 80% of its business, although 
the bovines business was also growing.  
This success was ultimately anchored to the partnership with Pingo Doce, which resulted from 
the project “pig with more flavor”, that allowed both Raporal and Pingo Doce to offer 
consumers a differentiated and better quality product.  
A Pig With More Flavour  
“Pig with more flavor” was the project for developing a type of meat that would have more 
flavor but that at the same time could be produced efficiently in large quantities. The challenge 
was on since the meetings back in 2007, between Raporal’s management and JM 
representatives. For three years investigations on how this could be done were carried on and 
finally in 2010 the meat was tested and approved by Pingo Doce.  
This new meat meant that Raporal no longer competed with a standardized product, but instead 
managed to differentiate its pork meat.  
Additionally it meant that Raporal and Pingo Doce would celebrate a 6-year contract, where 
Pingo Doce guaranteed the distribution of this new product.  
The decision to take on this challenge was unanimous amongst the board of directors, looking at 
it as an opportunity to strengthen the relationship with Pingo Doce, an important client with 
whom negotiations had always been very tough. Additionally Raporal saw in this “partnership” 
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a chance to reach large numbers of consumers and ultimately reach a larger sales volume that 
would trigger its growth.  
While the 6-year contract increased the dependency on an already very important client it also 
reduced the uncertainty in terms of sales volume and impaired payments.  
What Changed? 
When back in 2007 the administrative board decided to take on the project “Pig with more 
flavour” they also decided to implement some general business changes.  
The development of this project took over 3 years to be completed, during this time investments 
had to be made in R&D and implementation.  
The project was not only a change for Raporal but also an innovation for the entire industry. 
Given the desired characteristics, the breeding of the pigs had to be altered, as well as their 
eating habits and the environment where the animals were raised. Given the structure of 
Raporal, these changes affected the three units of the business
8
.  
Essentially what was desired was a pig with a higher fat content in order to make the meat 
tastier. Although this might appear contradicting, as recent trends show a general preference for 
lean meat , "In this new product, we have intramuscular fat, which avoids the need to add oil or 
other fats," explained Sr. Nuno Ramalho, administrator and responsible for the bovine business 
at Raporal. 
So in order to achieve this, the first challenge was to develop a particular breed of pig that 
would produce the meat with the desired characteristics. This part of the process required the 
partnership with PIC
9
, a genetic company.  
Additionally the pigs had to be castrated in order to avoid the more intense flavor associated 
with older male pigs. This was only one of the changes in the production line. The facilities 
where the animals were raised had to be upgraded and the pigs were slaughtered later than usual 
to increase their fat content.  
The animal feed plant was also directly affected as the pigs' diet was changed to include more 
vegetable fat. Indicators demonstrated that this new diet would be an important factor in making 
the meat taste better.  
At last the slaughterhouse was also modified, so that the meat could be treated and kept at the 
appropriate conditions.  
                                                          
8 Here the three main business units refer to the animal production, compound feed production, slaughtering and processing unit 
9 PIC is the international leader in providing genetically superior pig breeding stock and technical support for maximizing genetic potential to the global pork chain. 
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Other than the investment made to accommodate these changes, it was clear that the added 
flavour came at a cost, essentially due to the fact that these pigs ate more. Although this might 
sound like a minor detail, the feeding of the pigs represented around 80% of the costs associated 
with their production; therefore this characteristic of the new pig represented a significant 
increase in the production costs.  
The price of the animal feed was directly related to the price of the commodities used. 
Historically this market showed constant fluctuations which introduced a certain degree of 
uncertainty in the animal feed business. Eng. Cristina de Sousa, also responsible for the animal 
feed factory, ensured that the process was highly optimised as the combination of cereals used 
in the feed varied according to their price and availability, although never compromising the 
quality and nutrient content of the animal food. Nonetheless this remained as a challenging area 
because there was little or no control over the price of these raw materials. 
Despite the fluctuations in the prices of raw materials, in 2013 Raporal was supplying around 19 
million kilos of meat every year to Pingo Doce. These quantities were previously agreed at the 
time the contract was signed. Also at that time Raporal became aware that it would not be able 
to supply the full amount demanded by Pingo Doce because of its insufficient production 
capacity.  
In response, Raporal decided to find other producers who would be willing to sign a contract 
ensuring the production of a certain amount of meat under the exact same conditions. 
Additionally these partners had to purchase the animal feed from Raporal to ensure that the 
quality of the meat matched the standards.  Together, Raporal and these other 9 smaller 
producers would be able to supply the quantities required by Pingo Doce.  
The result of this partnership was an immediate success; in 2011 the “Pig with more flavour” 
was awarded the national “The Portugal Winner”
10
prize. In terms of annual performance until 
2013, sales were largely made under the umbrella of this contract, which allowed Raporal to 
continue to grow despite the economic downturn and decreasing consumption of pork meat.   
The Cost of Fame 
In spite of the success of Raporal´s strategic decision to differentiate its product in order to meet 
the needs of Pingo Doce, the sustainability of such agreement was an issue for Raporal.  
While the contract implied that the meat would be of superior quality in terms of flavour and 
tenderness, it also guaranteed that this meat would be sold exclusively under the Pingo 
                                                          
10 Award for animal production and health sponsored by Intervet Schering-Plough 





brand. In summary Raporal was essentially producing private label products, which 
meant that consumers were not able to relate the better product to Raporal, but instead 
associated it to Pingo Doce. Moreover it soon became evident that the differentiated product 
was not having as much impact as desired in the negotiations with the retailer. As a result, with 
almost its full production and distribution dependent on Pingo Doce, Raporal felt the pressure of 
a buyer with a very high bargaining power. This not only made negotiations harder, but also 
generated a degree of uncertainty towards the future as most of its sales were dependent on the 
will of a single buyer.   
The end… 
By 2013, the contract was half way through, and the board of directors used this “free flow” 
time to evaluate the agreement and the future of “Pig with more flavour” upon the end of the 
contract.  
At this point it had become clear that the initial aim of the differentiation, which rested in the 
ambition to improve the relationship with a client, was not achieved, as negotiations remained 
very tough. Moreover Raporal did not create enough brand awareness, with the differentiated 
product, although this was never its main objective. Nevertheless it did succeed in increasing its 
sales volume, and more importantly the growth of its business.   
In the eyes of Cristina de Sousa, large sales volumes were fundamental to Raporal’s growth. 
This in turn highlights the strong dependency on Pingo Doce, and predicts yet again another 











                                                          
11 The contract allowed for the selling of the meat through Raporal’s own stores but restricted any other channel including foreign markets where Pingo Doce would already be 
present such as Poland and Colombia 















Source of graphs: Raporal annual report (2012) 
 
 
Note that “Meat” refers mostly to the sales of fresh meat, although other 
categories are included as illustrated in the graph below. 




Exhibit 2 – Raporal Sales  
 
 
Source of data: Raporal annual reports (2006-2012) 
 
Exhibit 3- Raporal’s Earnings 
 
 



















Evolution of sales revenue  
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Exhibit 5 – Raporal’s Compound Feed Factory Production  
Evolution of quantity of animal compound feed produced  
 
Source of data: Raporal annual reports (2006-2012) 
Exhibit 6 – Raporal’s Slaughterhouse Activity 
Change in the number of animals killed in the slaughterhouse  
 
 












2006 120368 89567 23638
2007 162199 127012 20251 93% 7% 7% 93%
2008 283640 221341 36943 95% 5% 6% 94%
2009 283648 221478 40748 97% 3% 10% 90%
2010 282869 222514 37202 97% 3% 17% 83%
2011 356983 286657 44623 97% 3% 17% 83%
2012 345716 291439 42869 99% 1% 20% 80%




















Exhibit 8 –Raporal’s Reproductive Pigs 
 
 
Source of data: Raporal annual reports (2006-2012) 
 
Exhibit 9- Raporal’s Female Pig Productivity 
 
 























































Productivity of female pig per year 




Exhibit 10 - Meat Shop 




Source of images: Raporal annual report 2012 




Exhibit 11 – Changes in the Portuguese Grocery Retailing  
 
Source of data: Nielsen 
 
 



















Exhibit 13 – Raporal’s Products 
 
 




















Source of data: Kantar retail analysis (2013) 
 
Exhibit 15 – Grocery Market Concentration 
 
 










Market share (in sales revenues) of the top 















III. Literature Review 
 
This chapter is designed to introduce some of the 
theoretical notions and concepts that will aid in the 
development of the teaching note.  
The structure of this section is based on the idea of 
environmental layers (Johnson, G., K. Scholes, R. 
Whittington, 2008, p.64). In summary the notion is that in order to be strategically 
aware of the broad environmental factors, managers should understand that these belong 

































The Environment  
PESTEL Analysis  
The macro – environment is the first layer. It is essentially made up of various wide 
environmental factors that may or may not affect the organization. The PESTEL 
analysis is considered by many as a central tool to identifying these factors.  
In essence the PESTEL divides the environment into six categories, namely; political, 
economic, social, technological, environmental and  legal, as illustrated  in the picture 
below, and suggests that the trends identified will result in the clear understanding of 
the overall picture surrounding the company. (Johnson, Scholes, and Whittington 2008). 
 
 
The understanding of these forces will also 
allow managers to predict certain changes that 
may occur, and therefore perform the most 
adequate management strategy. Although 
simple and easy to apply, many argue that the 
model is too broad. And if on one side, O’Brien 
(2004) argues that this model will hardly result in the generation of new ideas, Burt et 
al. (2006) defended that the classifications proposed by the PESTEL are too generic and 
fail to deliver valid information that will help prepare for future changes.  
The Industry 
Porter’s Five Forces Model  
The next layer is the industry, which according to Porter (1979), consists of firms 
“assumed to be alike in all economically important dimensions except for their size”. 
(Porter M. 1979. P. 214). Porter (2008) introduced the five forces model as a tool to 
evaluate the industry’s overall attractiveness. Porter(2008) believed that it is important 
to look at; threat of new entrants, threat of substitute product, bargaining power of 
buyer, bargaining power of supplier and the rivalry amongst existing competitors to 
understand the industry. The diagram below illustrates these forces. 
 
Figure 1 PESTEL Analysis (Team FME (2013) PESTEL 
Analysis: Strategy Skills, FME, p.6) 




He goes on to say that being able to 
understand the competitive forces and 
ultimately their underlying causes, 
leads to the true understanding of the 
industry’s profitability. Furthermore he 
supports that this model is useful when 
anticipating competitor’s moves and 
therefore valuable for the management 
of profitability over time.  
Bargaining Power of Buyers 
The bargaining power of buyers “refers to the ability of consumers/buyers to exert 
pressure on the selling entity to get it to produce higher quality products/service at a 
lower price” (Wilkinson J. 2012). Obviously these conditions represent higher costs to 
the seller that will compromise its profits. It is also referred that industries with high 
bargaining power of buyers are more competitive whereas the opposite results in less 
competition. (Wilkinson J. 2012). 
When analyzing the industry and consequently the determinants of these forces it is 
important to understand what influences them.  
When it comes to the bargaining power of buyers, Porter (2008) refers the need to look 
at buyer concentration in comparison to that of the seller. He argues that when there are 
fewer buyers than sellers, bargaining power of the consumer is likely to be high. 
Furthermore he identifies high switching costs as power reducers since the buyer will 
have less bargaining power. In addition the buyer’s ability to integrate backward means 
high power to the buyer and the existence of substitute products tend to increase buyer’s 
bargaining power as well.  
Overall what Porter is suggesting is that once managers have the complete 
understanding of these forces, they will understand the industry and in turn be able to 
strategically position their companies.  
Figure 2: The Five Forces that Shape Industry Competition (Porter, M. E. (2008) 
“The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy”, The Harvard Business Review 
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The difficulty however lies in the measurement of these forces, it is not always clear 
which force is actually the strongest, (which will most limit the firm’s profitability) and 




The competitors are the third layer of the business environment. For this purpose we 
will not be directly speaking about other firms operating in the same industry, but 
instead we will be looking at modern distribution and their private labels which have 
become important participants in the competition for market share.  
With the changes that have been occurring in the food distributing sector over the years, 
so have consumer standards. Consumers, now look for low prices, product diversity 
and convenience.  (Ferreira, Manuel P., Reis, Nuno R. & Santos, João C., 2011). Moreover 
it is suggested that the growth of the discount stores demonstrates that the low price 
factor is becoming the most influential. (Ferreira, Manuel P., Reis, Nuno R. & Santos, João 
C., 2011). In response to these changes retailers have been continuously developing their 
private labels. However there is still debate on how beneficial private labels have 
become to supermarkets over the leading national brands. 
In summary private labels provide higher margins than national brands and in addition 
may also generate a certain degree of customer loyalty, which national brands fail to do. 
(Pauwels K. & Srinivasan S., 2004). 
 
Most importantly, private labels provide retailers with strategic bargaining power over 
manufacturers’ brands. (Meza S. & K. Sudhir 2009). During negotiations retailers are 
able to achieve better supply terms, which could include lower wholesale prices and 
better trade deals. (Pauwels K. & Srinivasan S., 2004). 
 
In addition retailers benefit from competitive knowledge of the national brands which 
allows them to easily imitate the leading brands, more so when they set the marketing 
mix (price, shelf space position and promotion) of both national and private labels. 
(Pauwels K. & Srinivasan S., 2004).  
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In conclusion, private labels bring to retailers certain advantages that allow them to gain 
additional bargaining power over manufacturers. That being the case it is most likely 
that the development of private labels will continue.  
 
In face of this trend, Hock (1996) suggests six strategic reactions, based on the 
dimensions of price and quality, for national brands to consider.  
 
1) Innovate   
Focus on the development 
of improved innovative 
product.  
2) More for the 
money  keep to the same 
prices, but offer more  
3) Reduce price gap 
offer products at lower 
prices 
4) Me – too strategy 
introduce a value flanker 
5) Wait and do nothing – 
do not decide on any strategic 
move 
6) Produce private label – supply retails with their own products 
The first strategy suggests that national brands should develop new and improved 
products in order to win competition with product differentiation. According to Glémet 
and Mira (1993) there is a negative correlation between manufacturer’s level of 
innovation and private label penetration.  
Another strategy also identified by Hoch is the more for the money approached which 
essentially focuses on keeping the same price level but offering something more. Ashley 
(1993) believes that advertising and brand strengthening are possible ways to offer 
something additional to consumers.  
Figure 3: Strategic Options (Verhaef, P. C. & Nijssen, E.J. & Sloot, L. M., 2000. 
“Strategic Reactions of National Brand Manufacturers towards Private Labels”, European 
Journal of Marketing, p. 1311) 
When modern distribution owns the piggy bowl 
37 
 
When reducing the price gap, however, Hoch (1996) is suggesting reducing price but 
maintaining quality, while this might seem promising it is obvious that profitability of 
the firm will be hurt as well as the relationships with suppliers.  
The fourth strategy proposes offering a low price and low quality option; however it is 
important to understand that the introduction of a value flanker is expensive and that it 
will be very hard to get shelf space from retailers, more so when relationships will most 
likely be hurt.  
A different approach is the wait and do nothing strategy, which as the name suggests 
implies doing nothing. The benefits of such approach are related to the fact that no 
investment is required. However, according to Porter (1996), not choosing a strategy 
can be very dangerous.  
Ultimately the sixth strategy proposes producing private labels, therefore increasing 
sales and improving relationship with retailers.  
In conclusion the model considers that increasing the gap by innovating and 
strengthening the brand image is the most effective strategy. However for products 
where private labels represent a large part of the market share, the strategy to produce 
private labels is most adequate. (Verhoef P.C. & Nijssen E.J. & Sloot L.M., 2000) 
In summary, the model highlights that the viability of these strategies will depend on the 
degree of product differences between national brands and the private labels in each 
category.  It is also apparent that the model lacks specificity in terms of product type 
which limits its applicability.   
The Company 
Competitive Advantage  
The last layer is about the company. The crucial question at this point is why do some 
firms in the same industry show different growth levels during the exact same period? 
Some believe that the difference is on the main strength and strategic advantages that 
different organizations will choose differently. (Prahalad C.K., 1993). This is also often 
referred to as core business competencies. The term core competencies is often 
confused with technical capabilities, however while these are simple isolated aspects of 
a firm, the other is a bundle of all technologies, customer knowledge and management 
intuitions combined together. (Prahalad C. K., 1993). In simpler terms a core 
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competency must be something that is hard for competitors to imitate, in addition it 
must be applicable to many products and markets and finally it must give something 
additional to consumers. (Prahalad C. K., 1993). 
In essence these characteristics of the concept of core competencies take us to believe 
that ultimately these will allow organizations to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage. Barney (1991) emphasizes “that firms obtain sustained competitive 
advantages by implementing strategies that exploit their internal strengths, through 
responding to environmental opportunities, while neutralizing external threats and 
avoiding internal weaknesses”. (Barney J., 1991, p. 99). The issue with this approach is 
that the environment is not static and therefore the sustainability of this competitive 
advantage must be carefully addressed. With this in mind the Resource Based View 
(RBV) suggests focusing on both firm’s performance and its internal features to identify 
a competitive advantage and a sustained competitive advantage. (Barney, 1991). He 
suggests that for a firm to achieve competitive advantage it must implement a value 
creating strategy that its current and potential competitors are not able to duplicate; 
where a sustained competitive advantage implies an even stronger inability of 
competitors to imitate both the strategy and its benefits. (Barney, 1991).  
However, reference must be made to the fact that a sustained competitive advantage will 
most likely not last forever. In fact with unexpected changes in the industry, it may 
happen that what was considered to be a source of sustained competitive advantage 
loses its value as the industry changes. (Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) also explains that 
firms will only achieve sustained competitive advantage if its resources are valuable, in 
the sense that they allow the firm to outperform its competitors. In addition these 
resources must also be rare, hard to imitate and in-substitutable.   
 











While core competencies are in the center of a firm’s competitive advantage, it is also 
arguable that businesses functions that enhance these competencies should be vertically 
integrated. (Prahalad C.K. & Hamel G., 1990) 
 
“By their 'make or buy' decisions firms decide their degree of vertical integration”. 
(Balakrishnan, S. & Wernerfelt, B., 1986, p. 347). Essentially vertical integration can 
help companies reduce costs and improve efficiency. Additionally when understanding 
vertical integration it is important to remember that there are various types of vertical 
integration, namely; backward and forward. (Harrigan, K. R., 1983). 
The concept of vertical integration has itself evolved over the years. Currently “The 
image of vertical integration as operations that are 100% owned and physically 
interconnected and that supply 100% of the firm’s needs is outmoded” (Harrigan, K. R., 
1983, p.1). Now the question is on the degree of scope of the integration. In other 
words, the key to a successful vertical integration is determined by how broadly 
integrated the firm should be at a particular time. Although these will vary, the same 
author purposes the following model to suggest some alternatives:  
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Figure 4: The Model of Vertical Integration Strategy (Harrigan, K. R., 1983. Vertical Integration, 

















Note: this model is designed for firms operating in an established industry; the strategic move will vary depending on 
the industry’s development.  
In the case of the illustration a company that is in an established market, has low 
bargaining power, stable competition and strategically aim for leadership, should 
engage in taper-integration, that is, integrate partially.  
In summary vertical integration is the result of two forces:  
1) Internal and cost benefits  
2) Effects of competitive pressures  
When looking at the first factor it is clear that what allows for these cost benefits is the 
improved coordination of activities. Moreover a certain degree of integration will mean 
that the firm can avoid time consuming tasks that include negotiations.  
(Harrigan, K. R., 1983). 
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In regards to the second force, it is suggested that it is mostly a result of marketing and 
technological intelligence as well as strong product characteristics that avoid replication 
from competitors. (Harrigan, K. R., 1983). 
Although there seems to be little involved when deciding to vertically integrate, it is 
important to understand that there is a certain degree of risk, mostly because the 
integration may have been more costly than the actual returns. On another perspective 
the risk with integration is related to the fact that too much integration will most 
certainly hurt the strategic flexibility of the firm, and that is fundamental to deal with 
the industry changes. (Harrigan, K. R., 1983). 
This raises the importance of the industry to the success of the firm’s performance. 
Under this line of thought is the concept of strategic dimensions introduced in 1996 by 
Michael Porter.  
Although we have been looking at the firms resources as a way to overcome 
competition and increase profitability, Porter (1985) believes that organizations can 
achieve above average performance by positioning themselves strategically within the 
industry. He suggests that companies can choose between perusing a cost leadership 
strategy or a differentiation strategy in order to achieve a competitive advantage. Later 
on he further divided these categories by introducing “cost focus” and “differentiation 
focus” strategies.  
 
The Cost Leadership Strategy 
This strategy can be applied by either 
focusing on increasing profits by cost 
reduction and industry – average prices, or 




Figure 5: Porter Generic Strategies (Porter, M. E. (1985).Competitive 
Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New 
York, NY: The Free Press, p. 12) 
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It is important to realize that cost leadership is about minimizing the cost to the 
organization of delivering products and services, and not necessarily offering the lower 
prices to customers. In summary, the cost leadership strategy involves being the leader 
in terms of cost in your industry or market. When deciding to peruse this strategy it 
important that managers are confident that they can not only achieve number one 
position but sustain this position. (Porter, M. E., 1985). 
Studies have demonstrated that in general companies with access to capital are more 
likely to be successful in this strategy as they can invest in technology that may bring 
costs down. In addition the success of this approach will be directly related to the 
efficiency of the company’s logistics, as again this will bring costs down. Ultimately 
cost leaders must have a low cost structure that allows them to suitably cut costs below 
those of the competitors. (OECD, 2012, Mindtools). 
The greatest risk in pursuing this strategy comes from the fact that these sources of cost 
reduction are not unique to a single firm, and therefore other competitors can easily 
copy these cost reduction strategies. (Porter, M. E., 1985). 
The Differentiation Strategy  
Differentiation, on the other hand, involves “making your products or services different 
from and more attractive than those of your competitors”. (OECD, 2012, 
Mindtools).There are many roots to differentiation which will most likely depend on the 
product and in the industry. In general however a successful differentiation strategy 
involves; “good research, development and innovation, and the ability to deliver high-
quality products or services”. (OECD, 2012, Mindtools). In addition to this it is argued 
by the author that this strategy requires “effective sales and marketing” in order for the 
consumers to understand the benefits of the different products.  
The Focus Strategy  
“Companies that use Focus strategies concentrate on particular niche markets and, by 
understanding the dynamics of that market and the unique needs of customers within it, 
develop uniquely low cost or well-specified products for the market”. (OECD, 2012, 
Mindtools). The article further suggests that the benefit of this approach lies on the fact 
that it is targeting a smaller group of customers; in turn this allows companies to 
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perfectly know their customers and build strong brand loyalty. In addition, given this 
relationship, other competitors seem to be less keen on entering these markets.  
Once deciding to pursue a focus strategy, managers should equally decide whether they 
will be cost leaders or differentiators.  
Finally, it is fundamental that when choosing which of the strategies to pursue, 
managers take into consideration the organization’s competencies and strengths. (Porter, 
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Overview of the case  
 
Raporal started as an animal compound feed factory, in 1971, and has grown vertically 
since then to become one of the most important players in the Portuguese market, with a 
2013 expected annual turnover of 100 million euros. It expanded gradually to become 
present in the compound feed production, animal production, meat slaughtering and 
meat processing markets.  
It was founded by 18 pig farmers who got together with the view to produce good food 
for their animals.  
After a period of significant growth, in 2006 Raporal experienced a bad year which 
triggered major administrative and management changes. In 2007 Raporal focused on 
the optimization of its resources and invested in technology as well as in the acquisition 
of new pig farms, in order to become a cost leader and successfully face the ever more 
competitive business environment.  
The changing industry trends, that showed an almost 100% shift towards modern 
distribution dictated the need to adjust its distribution strategy. In 2013 Raporal had 
overcome the period of transition, and was working together with the large distributors.  
“Pingo Doce was responsible for more than 50% of the sales”, while the percentage of 
sales through small sellers was becoming more and more irrelevant.  




While sales volumes kept increasing Raporal could not help but see its profit margins 
go down, mostly because of the tough negotiation with modern distribution agents. In 
the attempt to improve these relationships, Raporal decided to invest in the 
differentiation of its product which later was sold exclusively under Pingo Doce’s 
brand. Although sales figures were very promising, negotiations did not get any better.  
With a challenging period ahead, Raporal’s management was forced to continue to 
develop strategies that would gradually decrease the dependency on this modern 
distributor although clearly understanding that the market conditions dictated the need 























Learning Objectives  
 
Raporal’s case was specifically designed to serve as a teaching tool, valuable in 
management courses with emphasis given to strategic management topics.  
Being a large national producer, Raporal’s story illustrates the challenge that producers 
face with the increasing bargaining power of modern distribution. Additionally the case 
exemplifies the impact of different strategic approaches used as an attempt to overcome 
this problem. 
Although there are several approaches to look at this case, I suggest particular focus on 
the topics listed below: 
A.   Importance of understanding the business environment 
Applying a PESTEL analysis  
B.    The impact of the industry characteristics 
Applying Porter 5 forces model 
C.    Understanding the Company’s strategic positioning  
Identifying sources of competitive advantage and its sustainability, as well as applying 
porter’s generic strategies 
D.   Outlining the major sources of threats and opportunities as well as the company’s 
strengths and weaknesses 
Applying a SWOT analysis  
E.    Considering supermarket trends and their private labels and how these affect the 
industry players  
Underlying the alternatives to modern distribution 
 F.   Recommending strategic alternatives    




Assignment Questions  
 
These suggestions are designed to help students prepare for the in-class discussion of 
the case.  
 
 Which factors shaped Raporal’s growth over the years? 
 What were the major challenges that Raporal was facing in 2013? 
 What recommendations would you suggest, to Raporal’s management? 
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Class plan  
 
1) Which macro-economic factors did affect Raporal’s performance?  
2)  What industry trends did shape Raporal’s development?  
3)  What was the company’s major competitive advantage and how sustainable was it?  
3.1) What is the common source of these core competencies and how does it                                                
shape Raporal’s strategy? 
4) Summarize the opportunities and threats that resulted from the general context and 
identify Raporal’s strength and weaknesses. 
 4.1) What strategic alternatives were available? 
5) How did the development of supermarkets and their private label affect the animal 
production sector?  
 5.1) What was Raporal’s strategy and what were its major implications?  
6) Identify and recommend possible strategic directions considering the above findings.   
  





1) Which macro-economic factors did affect Raporal’s performance?  
The business environment is fundamental to the true understanding of the company’s decisions. 
As described in the previous chapter, this environment is the result of various external factors 
that although not controlled by the company will determine its performance. The PESTEL 
analysis will be applied to identify these factors.  
Political – Two years after the external rescue package; Portugal sees its economy slowly 
recovering. However the food sector could not avoid the need to recur to international markets 
to sustain its growth. Overall despites the international growth, Portugal maintained its deficit 
position, importing much more livestock than exporting. In addition the Portuguese bureaucracy 
has been heavily criticized for having a negative impact on the competitiveness of national 
producers. The year has also been marked by several attempts to regulate the negotiations 
between modern distributor agents and producers, which nonetheless had little effect.  
Economic – The economic environment has been marked by the decrease in consumption, 
which reached even the sales of food products. Also on a negative note the prices of raw 
materials, such as soy and corn demonstrated an upwards trend that brought additional 
difficulties to producers, who couldn’t recur to credit.  
Social – As families see their income go down, their consumption also decreased. As described 
previously figures for meat consumption decreased over 5 %, which meant that each person 
consumed less 6kg of meat than in the previous year. Additionally, the social environment has 
been marked by a general change in consumer habits as consumers become more price 
sensitive, and move towards cheaper substitutes. Consequently modern distributors gain market 
share over the traditional formats, and experience growth of the sales of their private label 
products. In response, producers have been forced to adjust their cost structure to the 
consumer’s economic capabilities, and are therefore not able to pass on the additional costs of 
production.  
Technological- Technological evolution has greatly contributed to the growth of this industry 
as it allowed for the production to be more efficient, both due to genetic and machinery changes. 
Nonetheless it was also this evolution that has been forcing smaller producers to exit the market 
and larger players to become more competitive. Another trend is the continuous growth of the 
internet that created additional opportunities to both producers and retailers.  
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Environmental and Legislative – The industry has been continuously affected by 
environmental and animal welfare norms that generally increased the production costs, 
especially when compared to countries outside the EU who do not experience such tough 





























2) What industry trends did shape Raporal’s development?  
The world’s population will grow from almost 7 billion now to over 9 billion in 2050. Will there 
be enough food to go round?  
        John Parker12  
That being said it is important to carefully consider the industry. For the purpose of this case we 
will focus on the livestock production sector, which despite the general perception that 
consumer needs will continue to grow, will face a number of challenges.  
 Porter five forces framework, will help identify these challenges and ultimately the overall 
attractiveness of this industry.  
Threat of New Entrants ------- Low 
As developed in the Literature Review, when evaluating the threat of new entrants it is 
necessary to look at the barriers to entry.  For such industry, economies of scale are a significant 
barrier. These are achieved through vertical integration and binding contractual agreements with 
large distributors, such as the case of Raporal and Pingo Doce. It is therefore clear that for a new 
entrant the capital risk is very high. Moreover, given the general trends towards modern 
distribution channels, the access to these may be difficult for a new player, who will most likely 
experience a great cost disadvantage. 
Although these factors result in a relatively low threat of new entrants, it is important to note 
that given the world integration of markets, industry specific trends are no longer limited to one 
country. That means that although the likelihood of a new player entering the market is low, 
there is the possibility of existing players entering new markets. In fact the Portuguese market 
has shifted from 100% self-production in 1974 to 60% in 2012. This means that 40% of the 
meat consumed in the country comes from overseas.  
Threat of Substitute Products ------Moderate 
Given the homogeneous characteristics of pork and bovine meat, it would appear at first that 
there are no substitutes. However during the 21
st
 century the general tendency towards the 
consumption of bovine and pork meat is decreasing, as consumers are moving towards healthier 
options such as poultry meat, fish and other substitutes such as soy and seitan, which in many 
                                                          
12
 The economist, 2011, The 9 billion - people question. 
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cases are offered at a lower price. This results in a moderate threat of substitute goods, which 
may be partly the driver for differentiation in such industry. 
Bargaining power of suppliers ----- Moderate 
As previously mentioned, in the case of Raporal, 80% of the production costs come from animal 
feed needs. That being the case Raporal is highly dependent on the prices of cereals, needed to 
produce the animal feed. However, because these are homogeneous commodities, easily 
available on the open market, the supplier has little bargaining power. 
Nonetheless to animal producers this does not mean that they have much power over suppliers, 
as this too is moderate given the market price constant volatility. In fact in 2012 the cost of 
production increased more than the selling price of the animals, due to the price variation of 
major cereals.  
Bargaining power of Buyers ------- Very high 
With the development of the modern distribution channels, the number of buyers is 
continuously decreasing. Buyers are becoming larger and responsible for purchasing a sizable 
percentage of the industry output.  
Additionally buyers have little switching costs, as there is still little differentiation in the sector. 
Moreover as retailers become closer to producers with their private labels, it raises the threat of 
the buyer’s backward integration.   
That being said it is easy to understand that due to a lack of alternative distribution channels, the 
bargaining power of buyers is very high and most likely will keep increasing. In addition the 
buyer’s price sensitivity will probably keep on pressurizing the wholesale prices and as a result 
the sector’s profit potential for the seller continues to decrease.  
Rivalry ------- High 
Although differentiation for pork and bovine meat products has started to develop, these 
products are still essentially perceived as homogeneous. That implies that all players are direct 
competitors, increasing the rivalry in the industry. Additionally, rivalry increases when the 
demand for the product is growing at a slower rate, such as in the case for the EU market. 
When trying to access the base of the competition it becomes clear that price is the most 
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determinant characteristic. In fact competition is so tough that experts say that prices are 25% 
cheaper than 5 years ago. This is worse when consumer switching costs are very low. 
Overall, the moderate threat of substitute products, low negotiation power and high rivalry 
dictate the industry’s unattractiveness. Additionally for companies operating in this industry, 
such as Raporal, these forces present an increasing challenge that will shape the firms 
development and limit its profitability. Although all forces will affect the companies in this 
industry, it is the high bargaining power of buyers that is most responsible for the limitations in 





















3)  What was the company’s major competitive advantage and how sustainable 
was it?  
Prahalad, C. K. & Hamel, G. (1990) suggested that a company’s long term growth is dependent 
on the development of the key areas of expertise that are unique to that specific company. They 
argued that these are defined as core competencies and further suggested that these are the 
critical aspects to achieving a competitive advantage.  
When applying this model to Raporal it is possible to conclude that its core competencies lay on 
the following:  
 Expertise in production13 technique – ability to minimize the production costs 
without compromising the quality or production capacity 
 High production and delivery quality – ability to produce reliable products on time, 
responding to all of the client’s needs.  
 Large production capacity – capacity to meet large volume demands and offer 
different products 
These characteristics add value to the final product and give Raporal a certain degree of 
competitive advantage. Although not fixed, it is still important to consider the changing market 
conditions. For this purpose the RBV model, previously introduced, will be used to access the 






Valuable – Raporal’s infrastructure and highly technical equipment are fundamental resources 
that allow it to produce good quality products at relatively low prices. Additionally, Raporal has 
been able to develop know how that allows it to outperform its competitors.  
Rare – Raporal has reached a size that is almost unique amongst national producers. However, 
                                                          
13
 Here production refers to all stages that result in the final product; including: animal feed production; animal production; slaughterhouse; meat transformation 
Figure 6: VRIO framework (Jurevicius, O. (2013), “VRIO analysis”) 
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its resources are not that rare, especially in the industry where vertical integration and high 
technical investments are almost necessary.  
In-imitable – It is easily understood that in the case of Raporal little emphasis is placed on the 
brand creation, mostly because it has achieved large sales volume by selling its product under 
supermarket private labels. This also means that it is not able to rely on customer loyalty. 
Additionally it means that its strategy is more easily replicated, even if at a higher cost.   
Substitutability - Pork and meat products can be substituted by other products; in fact figures 
suggest that consumers have started to change their habits as it has been previously discussed.  
Raporal’s continuous growth is a clear indicator that it has been able to maintain a value 
creating strategy. Its resources are valuable and somehow rare; however its strategy can be 
replicated. Overall it is possible to say that Raporal has a temporary competitive advantage.  
 
3.1) What is the common source of these core competencies and how does it shape 
Raporal’s strategy? 
The competencies identified above are essentially the result of the investment that Raporal has 
incurred to obtain a vertically integrated structure.  
Raporal started back in 1971 as an animal feed producer.  As its size grew it started to expand 
down the production chain, first with the acquisition of livestock farms, later the 
slaughterhouse, and finally the meat processing unit. If we simplify the entire process we can 
easily identify that Raporal is a vertically integrated company. It has control over every stage of 
the animal production, from conception to packaging.  
According to Harrigan, K. R. (1983), a company like Raporal should peruse tapper integration, 
which is integrating to a certain degree. Essentially what this vertical structure implies is 
investments, in technically improved production systems, general improvements in the facilities 
and additional management and coordination expenses. These however, have also become 
essential for the competitiveness of the firms in this industry.  
This behavior is mostly the result of production technological developments such as 
improvements in feed formulas, production facilities and equipment, nutrition and disease 
control. These advances allow for greater efficiency in animal production, leading to economies 
of scale and larger operations. 
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Simultaneously Raporal has been undergoing some degree of backward integration through the 
acquisition and or integration of other pig farms. This expansion allows Raporal to maximize 
the capacity utilization of its vertical structure.  
As a vertically integrated company Raporal is essentially able to reduce its transaction costs. 
Furthermore it is able to better combine demand and supply which result in a more efficient 
management. For instances Raporal knows how many animals it needs to feed before the 
decision to produce animal feed. Another important aspect of vertical integration is related to 
the control over the quality of the products. After the 1997 classical swine fever (CSF) and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreaks, quality become an increasingly important 
issue for meat producers.  
Joseph W. Luter, founder of Smithfield
14
 and supporter of a vertical production structure 
defended that; "Vertical integration gives you high quality, consistent products with consistent 
genetics. And the only way to do that is to control the process from the farm to the packing 
plant”.  
Ultimately the ability to create these economies of scale that reduce the production costs, also 
allow Raporal to practice low costs and position itself as a cost leader, gaining market share 
through charging low prices. Looking at the industry in which Raporal operates, the high 
bargaining power of the buyers tends to hurt the suppliers ability to charge average prices, in 
which case the low cost structure becomes fundamental in order for the company to increase its 








                                                          
14
 Smithfield is one of  the largest pork producer and processor in the United States 




4) Summarize the opportunities and threats that resulted from the general context 
and identify Raporal’s strength and weaknesses.  
The following SWOT analysis summarizes the most important elements that need to be 
























 Supply chain integration 
 Animal production expertise 
 Animal compound feed production 
expertise 
 Technologically advanced equipment 
 Innovative facilities 
 Control over pig genetic line (due to 
vertical structure) 
 Quality certifications 
 Economies of scale 
 Easy access to capital 
 Relation with one of the largest 
distributors in Portugal 
Threats 
 Volatility , price, quality and 
availability of raw materials 
 Low negotiation power with 
distribution channels 
 Changing consumer habits to 
substitute products 
 Increasing level of concentration 
which increases competition 
between larger organizations 
 Legislation, which may increase 
production costs and hurt 
competitiveness of firms 
 Differences in world legislation  
Weaknesses 
 Heavy cost structure (due to nature of 
business) 
 Weak brand 
 Low bargaining power over 
suppliers and buyers 
Opportunities 
 Rise of new product categories  
 Closing of small competitors 
 Easier access to foreign markets 
 Further technological advances, that 
may lead to new and more efficient 
forms of production 
 Growth of fast food chains, such as 
Prego gourmet, H3 
 Changing consumer habits towards 
convenient store formats 
 Growth of internet   
 Deficit in national production  




4.1) What strategic alternatives were available? 
Given the above scenario producers find themselves dependent on modern distribution to 
achieve large sales volumes. However, it is possible to identify some other strategic approaches 
that mitigate this dependency, at the cost of other implications.  
Alternative Distribution Channels 
In face of what is an increasing powerful distributor producers might find that the only 
alternative is to develop other channels or even create their own, bearing in mind that initially 
these will represent significantly lower sales volume and additional costs.  Possibly in the case 
of Raporal, this could be achieved through forward integration in which case Raporal would 
merge or acquire store spaces that would allow it to distribute its own product directly to 
consumers, without such a powerful intermediary. However for this approach Raporal would 
also need to invest in the development of its own brand as this would overcome one of its 
weaknesses and reinforce the success of the stores. Another alternative channel would be to use 
food chains to distribute its product; essentially this strategy brings the benefits and the 
drawback of recurring to supermarkets although at a smaller scale, as these are not as powerful. 
One example of this approach is CarneAlentejana that is distributed through many restaurants. 
Ultimately, producers could choose to distribute its product to foreign markets, benefiting from 
an enlarged market potential, and once again avoiding the dependency on a large distributor.  
Market Growth 
Another strategy aimed at managing the bargaining power of distributors is to gain market size. 
In simple terms this might be achieved through horizontal integration. In this case, Raporal 
would purchase another company that would be at the same level of production and 
consequently gain market size. In return it would benefit from a range of economies of scale as 
well as gain bargaining power. This approach would be much more efficient if the market was 
limited to Portuguese producers, but the fact that distributors have access to foreign markets 
makes this strategy more risky as it is harder to grow enough in order to gain significant size in 
the market. Additionally the costs associated with such alternative are very high. Another, less 
effective way of gaining market size is through vertical (backward) integration in which 
Raporal would merge or acquire existing animal farms and consequently increase its production 
capacity. This strategy is especially efficient when there are many small producers, which is still 
the case in Portugal. We can see that Raporal has been over the years engaging in this growth by 
acquiring or integrating pig farms, and this way it has increased its production capacity while at 
the same time increasing its efficiency through economies of scale.  
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 Brand Definition and Product Differentiation 
This strategy suggests investing in brand equity and product differentiation. Possibly Raporal 
could place more emphasis on the enforcement of its brand by distributing own brand goods, 
and investing in the communication of its superior quality products. While this approach clearly 
removes the dependency on the distributor, more so when the buyers switching costs are higher 
due to the product differences, it also removes the pressure on price as in theory products 
perceived of higher quality lead to higher willingness to pay. However it is important to 
highlight that given the current market conditions, the producer of this higher quality branded 
product still needs modern distribution to reach consumers. Additionally consumers still tend to 
look at these FMCG as generic and therefore might be less willing to value product differences. 
In the Portuguese market there are little examples of strong brands in this product category, 
however Nobre is the case of a leading brand for transformed meat products, and most recently 
CarneAlentejana is increasing its brand strength for fresh meat products, amongst the 
Portuguese consumers.   
Modern Distribution and Private Labels  
In face of these market conditions, most distributors, however, have decided to adapt their 
strategy, choosing to distribute through supermarkets and producing private label goods. 
Raporal is a case of a producer who is selling retailers private label products. By producing 
private labels, they are taking advantage of excess production capacity, as well as managing the 
relationship with important clients. The issue however is the same as identified previously; 














5) How did the development of modern distribution and private labels affect the 
animal production sector?  
The concept of modern distribution essentially refers to the economic activity that assures the 
intermediation between products and consumers. This is common to supermarkets, grocery 
stores, clothing stores, amongst others. In simple terms, through various transactions and 
logistics operations, modern distribution is able to deliver the products under the necessary 
conditions of time, place, price and convenience, satisfying consumer needs.  
As previously addressed, for the last two decades, traditional distribution channels have been 
watching their market share being progressively stolen by what we know of supermarkets
15
. 
Expectations are that modern distribution will own nearly 80% of the total grocery market. This 
trend is mostly the results of the supermarkets ability to offer products at prices lower than 
traditional stores; additionally their stores tend to be conveniently located and are known for 
offering a variety of products.  
Following the same direction is the retailers’ private label sales, which market share has been 
continuously growing. While some experts suggest that the performance of these products is 
linked to economic cycles, and therefore in recession periods these brands tend to grow, as 
explained in the Deloitte and Tauche 2003 report, others defend that this trend is expected to 
continue. In fact in some product categories the retailers’ brand dominates, which is the case of 
meat and poultry in most EU countries.  
To supermarkets private labels are an efficient way to gain more control over shelf space, 
achieve higher margins on the sales of these products, but also very importantly these are 
becoming a source of differentiation against competitors.  
In the case of Pingo Doce, private label products represent around 40% of the sales; 
consequently, shelf space available to national brands is on a continuous decrease. In some 
cases the supermarket only distributes the market leader and its private label product. Despite 
this evident decrease in market share from the manufacturers side it is important to note that 
there remain some very strong national brands that distributors must include amongst their 
product variety, such as the example of Coca-Cola.  
To firms in the agri-food sector this represents a change, and offers them some opportunities as 
well as threats. The below analysis aims to identify these major alterations.  
                                                          
15 For simplicity I will refer to supermarkets as modern distribution although as previously identified this term extends to all retailing sectors.  
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Modern distribution offers an organized and integrated distribution channel, which allows 
producers to avoid extra costs associated with traditional distribution. Furthermore these 
channels give producers access to a large pool of consumers, which in turn is reflected in the 
sales volumes achieved through this method that result in economies of scale. The contractual 
agreements with such distributors also guarantee the payments and the sales volume, preventing 
default payments and allowing for an adequate production planning.  Ultimately this extra 
production will give producers financing means to invest in R&D, which may result in more 
product innovation.  
On the other hand it is important to note that although tempting, these benefits come at a cost to 
producers. Essentially, this can be summarized in the dependency that producers create when 
distributing through modern channels. This dependency is also what empowers the distributors 
during negotiations, and what allows them to set the prices amongst other terms, that are most 
convenient to them. Note that the modern distribution market is extremely concentrated and 
price competition is very tough.  
Overall these factors tend to put distributors in a challenging situation, as the benefits of modern 
distribution channels are becoming almost necessary to producers. However the concern rests 
on the sustainability of these benefits, and whether or not the implications of this dependency 
will end up hurting the producer.  
This debate extends to the decision to get involved in the supply of private label products. 
Essentially, the question remains whether producing private label products is a beneficial long 
term strategy, or simply a short term approach. 
According to the model of the six strategic reaction (introduced in the previous chapter), 
proposed by Hoch (1996), Raporal should produce private label products. He highlights that in 
such industries, where retailer’s private labels represent a large market share, the strategy to 
produce private labels is the most adequate. In part because the decision to not produce a brand 
with a high market share will ultimately lead to a significant decrease in sales of that product 
category.  
When producing private label goods, producers are generally benefiting from the same 
conditions as when distributing through supermarkets. Additionally it can be seen as a mean to 
manage and improve relationships with important clients as well as guarantee a shelf space in 
the most important distributor stores and avoiding the costs associated with the development of 
a distinct brand. 
There are however some implications that in the long term may appear to be more relevant. The 
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first implication for producers is the loss of products as a marketing tool. Their brand will not be 
present on the packages and so, in this case the consumer will be oblivious to the investment in 
quality and animal welfare. Hence, the higher quality products will hardly be associated with the 
producer.  In simple terms, only the distributor will be able to identify a higher quality producer. 
This also means that producers are increasing the dependency on the distributors, consequently 
decreasing their bargaining power.  
 
5.1) What was Raporal’s strategy and what were its major implications? 
As previously identified in this chapter, Raporal had initially pursued a cost leadership strategy, 
benefiting from an intensive production system that allowed it to speed up the process of the 
animal growth, making the operation more cost effective.  
Initially, like most of its direct competitors, Raporal used to breed the “industrialized pigs”. This 
genetic line is the most profitable allowing for very low competitive prices. 
However, given the current market conditions and especially the almost 100% shift towards 
modern distribution, Raporal has been challenged with an increasing difficulty to reach 
consumers that has had significant impact on its profitability. That being the case it decided 
back in 2010 to sign a contract with one of the Portuguese largest distributors (Pingo Doce). 
With this contract Raporal assured the distribution of a large part of its production under private 
label, provided that the quality of the supplied meat would be significantly improved. As 
explained before this was achieved through the breeding of a different breed of pigs that was 
more costly to produce. In addition, the contract presented extra limitations for Raporal on the 
distribution of this better quality product, which could only be distributed through Pingo Doce.  
Essentially this alliance means that Raporal has changed its strategy from a cost leadership to 
differentiation.  
With this contract, Raporal is focused on producing higher quality meat, different from the 
generic pork meat, which is expected to meet customers’ requirements. The concern however is 
that according to Porter a differentiation strategy is successful when the firm is then able to 
apply a premium price for the valuable product characteristic, which is clearly not the case for 
Raporal as it is subject to negotiations with very powerful buyers. More so when the success of 
private label products is directly related to the fact that these products are offered at a lower 
price.  




6) Identify and recommend possible strategic directions, considering the above 
findings.   
Half way through the contract the question on what future strategic directions to embrace starts 
to appear on the horizon.  
The contractual agreement with Pingo Doce has certainly brought many advantages to Raporal, 
similarly to those previously identified. More so when it is impossible to separate Raporal’s 
expected success of 100 million euro annual turnover from Pingo Doce who is responsible for 
over 50% of Raporal’s sales. This takes us to the next aspect of this agreement; the “decision” 
to sell to a very powerful buyer.  
While before the agreement, the challenge was an inefficient distribution strategy, currently the 
distribution is very efficient but the adjacent negotiations are not. In simple terms, the high 
bargaining power of the buyers is resulting in lower profit margins.  
There are two ways to overcome such problem; the first is cutting the production costs, which 
we can assume is already at its optimum level
16
; the second is to increase its bargaining power. 







The first root alternatives suggest a certain degree of buyer selection
17
; however it is important 
to point out the limitations of such approach, when as previously identified, an almost 100% 
shift towards modern distribution is characterizing the industry. This trend dictates the limits of 
all alternative channels, even though the product has been differentiated. With this in mind 
some strategies are proposed:  
 Forward Expansion  
While maintaining its strategic positioning as a differentiator, Raporal would acquire or 
                                                          
16 Given current production specifications 
17 Buyer selection is introduced as a way to mitigate the power of buyers, by choosing buyers with less power to negotiate.  





Find an alternative distribution method 
Increase own bargaining power 
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integrate small stores in the center of Lisbon. These stores should follow the same format of the 
existing store
18
, but in a smaller scale. Operations should focus on offering clients convenience, 
quality, and product variety (amongst meat products) at a competitive price. This way Raporal 
would take advantage of the emerging new product categories such as low salt sausages or 
gluten free ham and expand its store variety.  
There is however one strong implication of this approach, which is the need to invest in brand 
equity. One way would be to open stands in locations close to many of its competitors, that way 
benefiting from the customer inflow. Possibilities include; Mercado de Campo de Ourique, 
Mercado da Ribeira, El Corte Inglés, or other food courts. This would allow Raporal to increase 
its brand awareness, which is necessary for the success of the stores. Additionally Raporal could 
maximize the potential of current clients, through online sales and online communications.  
The drawbacks of such approach are evident, Raporal will have to make a capital investment 
and at the same time reduce its sales volumes, as this distribution method will never be able to 
achieve the size of the modern distribution today. This might represent a significant financial 
challenge.  
 Internationalization  
Continue to differentiate to foreign markets. In 2013 the exports reached 3 million euros, a good 
indicator of these markets’ potential. Raporal is already well connected to many important 
external markets, namely Venezuela; the success of these partnerships may be an effective way 
for Raporal to reduce the dependency on a large distributor without reducing its sales volume.  
 Food Chains/ Restaurants 
 
By taking advantage of its production flexibility, Raporal could look at food chains as a way to 
distribute its product. The growth of food courts in shopping centers and with it the emergence 
of new food chains and restaurants offers an opportunity for producers. This way Raporal is 
selecting a less powerful buyer that at the same time may be able to provide large sales, 
although again these sales would not achieve the same size as with modern distribution.  
Alternatives 2#: 
The second root options look at ways to increase the producer’s bargaining power. Because 
these alternatives focus on large scale operations, they are binned to potent buyers. 
Additionally, although in theory, differentiation is positively related to higher bargaining power, 
                                                          
18 Refer to case study exhibit 10 for the current store layout 
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this alternative will not be proposed. For the next suggestions a cost leader approach is 
recommended, therefore abandoning the differentiated meat products. This is because the 
success of product differentiation is greatly dependent on the industry, and in this case, the 
industry has failed to differentiate. A strong indication of that is Raporal’s inability to create 
switching costs that locked the buyer, even more when the product has been almost tailored to 
the buyer’s needs.  With this in consideration the following strategies are proposed:  
 Increase size / grow 
Continue the process of lateral expansion, and gain further production capacity, which will help 
gain power both with suppliers and with distributors. Additionally and more effectively, engage 
in horizontal integration through the acquisition of direct competitors. This way, by increasing 
its production capacity Raporal is able to supply other important distributors and effectively 
decrease the dependency on Pingo Doce. Furthermore, by covering a higher market share, 
Raporal is guaranteeing its importance in the national market and with this increasing its 
bargaining power.  
 The risk of this approach lies mostly on the high capital requirements that it implies. In 
addition, the trend towards a global market and with it the easy access to foreign producers may 
limit the effectiveness of such approach, as the increase in size may be insufficient relative to 
the international market size.  
 Increase sales volume 
 
What the market has demonstrated so far, is that producing private label products, especially in 
this product category is an efficient way to achieve large sales volume. Given that, this strategy 
proposes producing private label goods, but simplifying the production process. In this case 
Raporal would have to go back to producing an undifferentiated product. This way it would 
become more price competitive and more likely to resist the distributor’s tough conditions. 
Essentially the risk is that this will decrease Raporal’s bargaining power, and increase the level 










My personal recommendation is based on the above findings and expectations of future trends.  
According to these I understand that it is necessary to combine a number of the above strategies 
in order to maintain economic growth and at the same time decrease the dependency on the 
distributors.  
With this in mind Raporal should simplify its production process by moving again towards a 
cost leader, essentially exchanging the production of the better quality pig for the 
“industrialized” pig. This would allow Raporal to cope better with the distributor’s conditions, 
understanding that these will remain in the foreseeable future important “business partners”.  
Moreover I suggest that Raporal increases its production capacity by engaging in both 
horizontal and vertical integration. This is the central part to actually decreasing the 
dependency on Pingo Doce. Only by sufficiently increasing its production capacity, Raporal 
will be able to supply other important clients. In a first stage approach the initial suggestion to 
simplify its production, is fundamental as it will allow Raporal to reach that increased 
production capacity significantly faster, as well as generate additional economies of scale.  
Ultimately I suggest that as Raporal focuses on gaining size in the home market, it should also 
focus on internationalization as an important way to achieve large sales without leaning on the 
same distributor and therefore reducing this dependency. Noting that again for this to be 
















This thesis has been developed to understand some of the major challenges affecting the 
food sector in Portugal. The findings account for the increasing bargaining power of 
distributors as well as the growth of their private label. The purpose of Raporal’s case is 
therefore to best recognize how in practice firms operating in this sector are responding 
to this threat.  
The elaboration of this work has given me valuable knowledge about the agricultural 
and food business, especially through the understanding of Raporal’s strategic 
directions. Additionally it has allowed me to gather important information about the 
Portuguese grocery market and its most important players.  
As a consumer I have learned the importance of the relations between these industries, 
and consequently become concerned about the future of product variety and quality 
available. 
With the aid of some academic models combined with the practical search for 
alternative channels, I have concluded that in fact the best direction, for this company, is 
to produce private label products to powerful retailers.  These findings also suggest that 
such approach limits the viability of a differentiation strategy, as a private label product 
is bound to low prices. However, as in any area, the best way to mitigate risk is through 
portfolio differentiation, in which case I suggest the adoption of more than one 
alternative. And the research evidence suggests the importance of a vertical structure as 
the solution to coping with this threat, as well as to increasing the company’s bargaining 
power.  
Nonetheless it is important to note that the generalization of these results is subject to 
some limitations. Therefore if I had more time and additional means I believe it would 
be very interesting to investigate other major players in the industry in Portugal in order 
to understand their strategic direction.  
However regardless of the extent of the research, the outcome is dependent on the future 
development, and although everything indicates that the trends identified will continue, 
only time will actually be able to evaluate such findings.  
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